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The Setting
It all started back in 1969, when the new Republican Administration
provided Congress with two separate proposals for what developed
into the minimum tax.' These were the days of the frontiersmen, when
a substantial number of high-income individuals legitimately paid little
or no Federal income tax. There were a variety of reasons. In some
cases, taxpayers were able to permanently exclude certain items (such
as tax-exempt interest) from income. In other cases, taxpayers were
able to claim a current deduction for noncash outlays (such as per-
centage depletion exceeding a taxpayer's cost). In still other cases, in-
come was deferred through the use of accelerated deductions (such as
accelerated depreciation).
The House version of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 followed the
second set of proposals introduced by Treasury in 1969, by placing
a limitation on the use of tax preferences and by requiring taxpayers
to allocate certain of their itemized deductions between taxable income
and various preferences, with the latter deductions being disallowed.2
Congress wanted to close down the frontier. The House Ways and
Means Committee stated that "no one should be permitted to avoid
his fair share of the tax burden-to shift his tax load to the backs of
other taxpayers." The Senate agreed, but took a different approach,
which was ultimately adopted by the Conference Committee. In addi-
tion to launching a direct attack upon preferences, the Senate decided
upon what we now know as the minimum tax.4 This was viewed as a
more effective and considerably simpler way to impose a tax on prefer-
ence items. Euphemistically, what emerged was a cross between a sheep
and a cow. The minimum tax became an additional rather than an
alternative tax, but the alternative nature of the House version was
I U.S. TREASURY DEPT., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS,
pts. I and 2, 13-15, 94-95, 132-52 (Feb. 5, 1969) (suggesting a minimum in-
dividual income tax and the allocation of deductions between taxable income and
various preferences); U.S. TREASURY DEPT., TAX REFORM PROPOSALS,
Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5050-51, 5060-78, 5280-86 (April 22, 1969) (pro-
pozing a limit on tax preferences (LTP) and the allocation of deductions).2 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 77-83 (1969).
3 Id. at 78.
4 See S. REP. NO. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 111-18 (1969).
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recognized by allowing taxpayers to reduce their preferences by $30,000
plus their regular tax liability before applying the minimum tax rate.5
Time marched on. By 1973, it was apparent that the 1969 minimum
tax provisions were not really living up to expectations. That year, the
Treasury suggested an alternative tax on minimum taxable income
(MTI) and a limitation on the deductibility of artificial accounting
losses (LAL)., Nothing happened until 1975, when the House accepted
LAL in a variety of tax shelter areas and tightened the minimum tax
provisions for individuals by adding new preferences, reducing the
preference offset, and increasing the rate of tax.7 When the Tax Reform
Act of 1975 reached the Senate, however, it reacted differently to the
clearly perceived abuses. The Finance Committee expressed concern
over the fact that high-income individuals were still able to avoid paying
any income tax, but suggested that the House approach was unneces-
sarily complex and indiscriminate, in that it would have interfered with
economically meritorious investments.-' The Senate approach generally
prevailed in conference. 9 Thus, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 expanded
the minimum tax for both individual and corporate taxpayers and dealt
with tax shelters through a variety of new at risk, recapture, capitaliza-
tion and partnership provisions.
Modifications were also made in those provisions dealing with the
maximum tax on earned (now, personal service) income. The minimum
tax and the maximum tax have always complimented one another.
Back in 1969, when shelters were in their heyday, the House Ways
and Means Committee observed that reducing rates was one of the
best ways to discourage tax shelter activity. It was then that the maxi-
tax was born. The Committee was confident that reducing the marginal
rate on earned income to 50 percent would direct taxpayer efforts
toward those activities which were economically justified on a before-
tax basis. 10 Thus, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 went into conference
5See H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 301-2 (1969). A Senate
floor amendment raised the minimum tax rate from 5 to 10 percent and allowed
taxpayers to reduce their preference items by their regular taxes, in addition to
the $30,000 exemption adopted by the Senate Finance Committee. 115 CONG.
REC. 38297-99, 382313-15 (1969). The carryover of regular taxes in exces; of
otherwise taxable preferences was added by the Excise, Estate, and Gift Tax
Adjustment Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-614, § 501, 84 Stat. 1846-47). Tha
Revenue Act of 1971 (Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 303(b), 304, 308, 601(c) (4) and
(5), 85 Stat. 522-25) also made several changes in the minimum tax.
6 U.S. TREASURY DEPT., PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE 9-18, 83-104
(1973).
rSee H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 28-85, 130-32 (1975).
There were also a variety of other tax shelter provisions, such as an at risk
limitation for intangible drilling costs. Id. at 85-130.
SS. REP. NO. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1976).
•See S. REP. NO. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-107 (tax shelter provisiors),
108-14 (minimum tax) (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
407-24 (tax shelter provisions), 425-28 (minimum tax) (1976).
10 H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 208-09 (1969).
TAX CONFERENCE
with a maximum tax provision approved by the House (although ab-
sent from the Senate version of the bill). The conferees adopted the
50 percent limitation, but with one modification which tied the two
complimentary minimum and maximum tax provisions together on a
formal basis. The earned income eligible for the special rate was to
be reduced by tax preferences in excess of $30,000.1'
By 1976, however, it had become apparent that the maximum tax
provisions (like the minimum tax) were not working as well as ex-
pected. The Senate Finance Committee attributed this to a number of
factors, including the availability of the $30,000 exemption. Ulti-
mately, the Senate decided to eliminate the exemption, add its new
minimum tax items to the preference offset, and extend the maximum
tax to pensions, annuities, and deferred compensation. The Conference
Committee agreed, although the additional preferences were those
added to the minimum tax by the conferees. 1 2 The result has been a
particularly strong deterrent to the use of tax shelters.
Timber: Taxing Preference Income
Timber affords the best insight into how the minimum tax computa-
tions work, because the provisions which affect timber reflect a little
bit of the old and a little bit of the new. Take, for example, the indi-
vidual entrepreneur who raises timber. When the timber is cut, the
taxpayer can elect to treat the difference between fair market value
and basis as gain or loss from a sale or exchange. Or, when he disposes
of the timber under any contract which reserves for him an economic
interest in the timber, the same treatment will automatically apply. In
either case, the statute generally converts the gain into a capital item,' 3
thereby bringing into play the minimum tax provision under which the
untaxed portion of a net capital gain is an item of tax preference (num-
ber nine on the list of 11 ).
The individual timber entrepreneur gets no special tax relief. He
will have to compute his minimum tax liability just like any other in-
dividual taxpayer. The rate is now 15 percent. The exemption is now
the greater of $10,000 or 50 percent of the taxpayer's regular tax
liability, determined by excluding any penalty taxes on early distribu-
tions from an individual retirement account or, in the case of an owner-
employee, from a Keogh plan and by excluding the separate tax on a
lump sum retirement plan distribution. The regular tax carryover
provisions have been repealed.
Timber corporations, on the other hand, are the sole remaining relic
"I See H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st SeEs. 329 (1969).
'
2 See S. REP. NO. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 114-16 (1976); H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 428 (1976).
13 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 631(a) and (b), 1231(b) (2). Gains on the
sale of timber may alko be covered under section 1231 (b) (1).
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of the past"--the good old days when the minimum tax provisions
were really little more than a paper buffalo roaming the tax shelter
frontier. For timber corporations, the capital gains preference attributa-
ble to timber income will continue to be subject to tax at the old rate
of 10 percent. The old exemption of $30,000 plus the corporation's
full regular tax liability, determined by excluding any personal holding
company and accumulated earnings tax, also remains in effect, while
other (less fortunate) corporations now qualify for an exemption of
only $10,000 or, if greater, their regular tax. Timber corporations can
also take advantage of the regular tax carryover provisions (otherwise
repealed), so that timber related regular taxes that are not applied
against preferences in the current year can be carried forward for a
period of seven years to offset that part of the minimum tax base
attributable to timber gains. The result will be significant complexity
as taxpayers struggle to determine how much of their corporate income
tax is (and, for past years, was) attributable to timber income. The
restriction is also somewhat anomolous, in that there is no limitation
on a taxpayer's ability to use that portion of its current tax liability
attributable to nontimb-r sources to offset its current timber tax prefer-
ence income. Instead, there is a special formula which, in effect, allows
the taxpayer to use its regular taxes attributable to nontimber sources
to offset current timber tax preference income, at the expense of a re-
duction in the regular tax deduction available to offset other preference
items. 15
The Fruit or Nut Tree Joint Venture: Tax Benefit, Partnerships and
Small Business Corporations
Preferences, by implicit definition, are supposed to produce a tax
benefit, and, if they do not, there should presumably be no minimum
tax. By way of illustration, assume that the Almorange Joint Venture
14 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 427-28 (1976); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 108 (1976) (hereinafter cited as JOINT COM-
MITTEE GENERAL EXPLANATION).
15 For timber corporations, the entire regular tax deduction (not just that
attributable to timber gains) must be reduced by one-third or, if less, the so-
called preference reduction for timber which in effect restores for timber gains
the old 10 percent minimum tax rate and $30,000 exemption. In unusual cir-
cumstances, however, a timber corporation will be able to claim both the old
$30,000 exemption with respect to its timber gains and the new $10,000 amount
with respect to all of its tax preference items. This could occur when the cor-
poration's credits reduce its tax liability below $10,000. See INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, §§ 56(d), 56(e), 57(a) (1) (9) (C)., and 57(e).
Conceptually, the special timber provisions do not work quite right because
Congress chose to integrate them within the new 15 percent tax rate, $10,000
minimum exemption structure. Far more complexity, however, would have re-
sulted by requiring taxpayers to separately determine their preference tax on
timber gains under a different set of statutory rules.
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(a partnership) is set up to invest in almond and orange groves. There
are four general partners, two individuals and two personal holding
companies, which put up very small amounts of cash. The partnership
borrows heavily from the bank on a nonrecourse basis, goes out and
buys a number of citrus and almond groves, and leases them to a third
party in order to avoid having to cope with the day-to-day operational
problems. Several years later, the trees start to produce. At that time,
the investment credit and accelerated depreciation under the 200 per-
cent declining balance method become available. 16 But the partners
will be able to claim a current deduction for their share of partnership
losses only to the extent that they are at risk. Also, any accelerated
depreciation attributable to the acquired citrus and almond groves will
constitute an item of tax preference (as item number three on the list
of 11). 17
The Almorange Joint Venture faces two separate levels of tax bene-
fit concern under the minimum tax. First, what about accelerated de-
preciation which, although allowable, must be deferred because an
investor does not have enough at risk? The House Ways and Means
Committee focused upon this problem in the context of LAL, by pro-
viding that any deduction deferred under LAL was not to be considered
an item of tax preference.16 The problem was buried, however, as the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 made its way through Congress and the
innovative solution to tax shelters shifted away from LAL to at risk.
Literally, a deferred but allowable item of tax preference must be in-
cluded in the minimum tax base right away. New section 58(h) does
give the Treasury authority to write regulations under which preferences
can be adjusted "where the tax treatment giving rise to such items will
not result in the reduction of the taxpayer's tax . . . for any taxable
years." But, although addressed to the problem of tax benefit, this
language would not appear to be particularly helpful in the at risk
case, where it is impossible to conclude that deferred deductions will
16See Rev. Rul. 65-104, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 28; JOINT COMMITTEE
GENERAL EXPLANATION 41 n. 4 (1976). However, the individual partners
will not be able to claim the investment credit by reason of section 46(e), which
limits the availability of the credit in the case of noncorporate lessors. For pur-
poses of section 46(e), personal holding companies are viewed as corporations.
17 The at risk provisions apply to individuals and personal holding companies
engaged in the leasing of section 1245 property through a partnership. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 465(a) and (c) (1) (C); see JOINT COMMITTEE
GENERAL EXPLANATION 36 n.2. The minimum tax provisions apply to
accelerated depreciation claimed by individuals and personal holding companies
on items of section 1245 property subject to a lease. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
H9 57(a) (3) and 58(i). Both statutory provisions refer to section 1245 property
as defined in section 1245(a) (3). Section 1245 property thus includes tangible
property (other than personal property) used as an integral part of production,
defined by regulation to encompass the cultivation of orchards. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1245-3(c) (1) (i) and (2) (1965) and Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(d) (2) (1964).
Is H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1975).
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never produce a tax reduction. The Joint Committee's General Ex-
planation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,19 however, does indicate
that preference items giving rise to losses which are suspended under
the at risk provisions are not to give rise to a tax benefit until the year
in which a suspended deduction is allowed.
Section 58(h) is really directed at the traditional tax benefit problem
which was of concern to Treasury when it developed the proposed
regulations under the minimum tax sections back in 1970. It is this
problem, of course, that is of second level concern to investors in the
Almorange Joint Venture. Assume that individual Partner A is able to
deduct $30,000 as his allocable share of the sole partnership deduction
which for him includes a tax preference in the amount of $20,000.
However, A, for the same taxable year, is also able to claim a deduc-
tion for home mortgage interest and gifts to charity of $20,000. His
gross income totals $40,000 (including $30,000 from the partnership).
Because A's deductions ($50,000) exceed his gross income ($40,000),
no regular tax will be due, and, by operation of section 172, the unused
deduction of $10,000 will not be available as a net operating loss
carryover or carryback. This, then, brings us to the question of tax
benefit. Stated quite simply, should the unused deduction be viewed as
accelerated depreciation, thereby reducing the item of tax preference
for the current year from $20,000 to $10,000? The proposed regula-
tions say "yes", through the application of a recomputed income
device.20
The problem becomes somewhat more complicated when there is a
current net operating loss and long-term capital gain. Assume, this
time, that Partner A has gross ordinary income of $70,000 from non-
business sources, a long-term capital gain of $10,000, and nonprefer-
ence business deductions from the partnership (the Almorange Limited
Partnership decides to claim only straight-line depreciation) of $90,000.
A will have no taxable income, with gross income of $80,000, a section
1202 deduction of $5,000, and business deductions of $90,000. On
the other hand, the section 1202 deduction represents an item of tax
preference, ostensibly subject to the minimum tax. At this point, how-
ever, the proposed regulations step in and say "no", the theory being
that the deduction will cause A to lose $5,000 of his net operating loss
carryover or carryback, so that there cannot possibly be a tax benefit.21
19 JOINT COMMITTEE GENERAL EXPLANATION 107 n. 1.20 Propozed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-4(b) (1) (i), (c), and (e), Ex. (1), 35 Fed.
Reg. 19769-70 (1970).21 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-4(b) (1) (ii), (c), and (e), Exs. (2) and (3),
35 Fed. Reg. 19769-70 (1970). For corporations, a separate capital gains tax
benefit provision appears in Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(i) (2), 35 Fed. Reg.
19765-66 (1970). This provision was adopted pursuant to statutory language re-
quiring the Treasury to prescribe regulations setting forth the extent of the capital
gains preference for corporations which do not use the alternative tax.
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The loss occurs because a net operating loss must be computed without
regard to the section 1202 deduction, thereby reducing A's carryover
or carryback to the difference between $90,000 of deductions and
gross income of $80,000.
Having reached this level of complexity, let us make life more
difficult first by assuming that the income items were received in 1978,
while the business deductions became available in 1977 (thereby pro-
ducing a 1977 net operating loss of $90,000), and then by assuming
that the same events occurred in reverse order. If the tax benefit con-
cept is to make any sense at all, it arguably should not make any differ-
ence whether the net operating loss being applied in a particular year
got there as the result of a carryforward or a carryback-in either case,
the section 172 modifications will cause A to lose $5,000 of his net
operating loss. Thus, in case one, A should not have to pay a minimum
tax for 1978 (assuming neither taxable income nor net operating losses
during the carryback period), while in case two (assuming no taxable
income during the balance of the carryback period), he should be able
to recover the minimum tax he incurred in 1977, before he was able
to apply the net operating loss carryback, even though there was some
limited deferral because of his ability to use the section 1202 deduction
right away. The proposed regulations come out the same way.22
One further example of the mismatching of net operating losses from
other years and current income and deduction items is useful. Let us re-
turn to something akin to the first example, this time in which A has a
depreciation deduction of $30,000 (including a preference of $20,000),
gross income of $40,000, and other nonbusiness deductions of
$10,000, bringing his taxable income down to exactly zero. However,
he also has a net operating loss carryover of $20,000, all attributable
to nonpreference items. As a result, should his current preference
escape the minimum tax under tax benefit concepts, at least for the
time being? It may be quite logical to say "yes", but then some vehicle
would have to be developed in order to make certain that the net
operating loss carryover disappeared or became an item of tax prefer-
ence in subsequent years, so that it could not do double duty later on.
Expiring net operating losses do, of course, disappear, so that a special
rule could be constructed for them. The proposed regulations, however,
decide against any special tax benefit provisions under the circum-
stances, by keeping carryovers (and carrybacks) out of the recomputed
income device. 8
22 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-4(b) (2) and (e), Ex. (4), 35 Fed. Reg.
19770-71 (1970). Although the example deals only with carryovers, the language
of the regulations is broad enough to cover carrybacks.
23 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-4(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 19770 (1970). Recomputed
income or loss is to be computed without regard to the net operating loss deduc-
tion.
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What has happened to the tax benefit concept as articulated in the
proposed regulations? Back in 1975, the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee expressed concern over the fact that there were cases in which
a person derived no tax benefit from an item of tax preference and,
yet, could still be subject to the minimum tax. The Committee recog-
nized that the Service, through regulations, had dealt with the problem,
but decided that it would be appropriate to adopt a specific statutory
provision, which is present section 58(h). In doing so, the Committee
made two points, which were subsequently endorsed by the Senate
Finance Committee. Neither Committee intended to make any judg-
ment about the authority of the Treasury to issue the proposed tax
benefit regulations under then existing law. Also, a tax benefit was to
include tax deferral, even if only for one year.2 4 Thus, most of the
concepts which appear in the proposed regulations could be retained
for the future and probably will be. Two significant questions, however,
arise with respect to the availability of a minimum tax refund when a
carryback gets applied against the taxpayer's section 1202 deduction
for the carryback year, and with respect to the use of net operating
loss carryovers and carrybacks in determining recomputed income.
Both problems will have to be reexamined in light of current law.
And so, we return briefly to the Almorange Joint Venture in order
to determine how the minimum tax provisions work mechanically in
the context of a partnership. Partnerships are one of seven conduit
entities-i.e., partnerships, estates, trusts, electing small business cor-
porations, common trust funds, regulated investment companies and
real estate investment trusts-which are discussed separately under the
proposed minimum tax regulations.25 A partnership, as such, is not
subject to the minimum tax and has no items of tax preference. In-
stead, each partner, in computing his own items of tax preference, must
pick up his share of partnership income and deductions which are
labelled by statute as preferences. The approach differs from that taken
in the case of an electing small business corporation, where items of
tax preference are computed at the corporate level as if the minimum
tax applied to the corporation. Then, all of these items, except certain
capital gains, are apportioned among shareholders on a pro rata basis,
per a per diem of ownership formula set forth in the statute, with a
further prorating to determine each shareholder's portion of each item
of tax preference. The approach raises some interesting tax benefit
questions when the corporation incurs a net loss equal to or greater
than its preference deductions.
24 H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 131-32 (1975); S. REP. NO.
94-938, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 113-14 (1976).
25 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.58-2 through 1.58-6, 35 Fed. Reg. 19774-77
(1970).
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The Oil Company: Net Operating Losses, Oil Preferences and
Regular Corporations
Net operating losses raise special problems under the minimum tax.
For purposes of illustration, let us take the Ace Diversified Mining
Company which drills for oil and gas, mines coal, and manufactures
widgets. Ace happens to qualify as an independent producer of do-
mestic crude oil and domestic natural gas,26 so that when it makes a
profit it can claim percentage depletion not only as the result of its
coal mining operations but also in connection with its oil and gas
drilling activities. For 1977, Ace claims a depletion deduction of
$400,000, which constitutes an item of tax preference. As it turns
out, Ace also incurs routine operating expenses of a nonpreference
nature in a substantial aggregate amount. Together, these deductions
exceed Ace's gross income by $300,000, so that it has a net operating
loss of $300,000 available for use in subsequent taxable years. Under
these circumstances, should Ace currently have to pay a minimum tax
on its item of tax preference, at least some portion of which, one might
argue, produces no immediate tax benefit? We are, of course, back to
tax benefit concepts, with one significant difference. From the inception
of the minimum tax provisions, special rules (which, in fact, support
the broader tax benefit concept) have been available for those tax-
payers who incur a net operating loss which may be carried over to
subsequent taxable years. Although Congress might have said that
preference deductions should be stacked (or used up) first, or that in
all cases preferences should immediately be subject to a minimum tax,
it did not. Instead, the statute assumes that when there is a net operat-
ing loss, the loss will include preferences in excess of the minimum
exemption (now $10,000), so that the tax on these preferences will be
deferred until the loss is actually used, if ever.27 At that time, a mini-
mum tax will be imposed at the rate in effect when the preference
arose.2 8 Thus, in 1977 Ace will have to compute a current tax on that
portion of its item of tax preference deemed not to have become part
of its net operating loss ($100,000), and the tax on the remaining
$300,000 ($45,000) will be deferred.
The statutory stacking rules which apply in subsequent taxable years
during the carryover period are consistent with this approach. That
portion of a net operating loss attributable to nonpreference items will
be used up first, thus further delaying the imposition of a minimum
tax. It may even be that the carryover period will expire before the
tainted portion of a net operating loss can be deducted, the result being
20See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 613A.
27 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 56(b). If the loss can immediately be carried
back and deducted in a prior taxable year, there will be immediate use, so that
the net operating loss deferral provisions do not apply.28 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1975); S. REP. NO.
94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1976).
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a permanent forgiveness of the initially deferred tax. 9 Viewed in a
somewhat different fashion, as suggested by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee in 1969, the expiring net operating loss then becomes available
to reduce the deferred minimum tax base.30
Interesting things occur, however, when the net operating loss carry-
over has to be reduced under section 172. Here, the proposed regula-
tions state that the tainted portion must be used up first. Thus, assume
that Ace is a sole proprietorship doing business as the Ace Diversified
Mining Company. In 1977 it incurs a net operating loss of $500,000,
which Ace (the individual) carries over to 1978. Of this amount,
$200,000 is tainted, carrying with it a potential minimum tax of
$30,000. In 1978, the proprietorship cuts down substantially on its
activities and receives gross (ordinary) income of only $300,000. Ace
(the individual) also recognizes a long-term capital gain of $100,000.
Current deductions (of a nonpreference nature) total $100,000. Thus,
Ace has taxable income for 1978 of $250,000 before taking into ac-
count the net operating loss carryover and his personal exemption. The
carryover reduces taxable income to zero, and, because the nontainted
portion of the carryover is used up first, there would at first appear to
be no minimum tax. However, this is not the case. In computing the
carryover to 1979, Ace's net operating loss must be reduced by the
section 1202 deduction of $50,000. According to the proposed regula-
tions, this $50,000 amount must be taken from the tainted portion of
the carryover, even though a nonpreference amount remains. Applying
the tax benefit principles established later in the regulations, the regula-
tions conclude that Ace will thereby incur a minimum tax of $7,500-
15 percent of the section 1202 deduction.$' Any other result would
make no sense. The problem, however, is that the regulations reach the
right result for what would appear to be the wrong reason. The tax
benefit results not from the fact that the taxpayer is able to use his
section 1202 deduction, but rather from the fact that a deferred prefer-
ence is being used in lieu of the section 1202 deduction to produce a
current tax benefit. Thus, although the regulations come out the other
way, there should be a minimum tax where, as the result of the section
172 recomputation, a deferred preference is being used in lieu of a
taxpayer's Western Hemisphere trade corporation deduction to produce
a current tax benefit.32 Generally, if the regulations can be criticized,
it is because they require the section 172 modification to come first
from that portion of a net operating loss carryover attributable to de-
ferred preferences.
Before leaving the Ace Diversified Mining Company, it would be
29 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.56-2(c) (1), 35 Fed. Reg. 19759 (1970).
30 S. REP. NO. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116-17 (1969).
31 See Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.56-2(c) (1) and (e), Ex. (4), 1.57-4(b) (2),
35 Fed. Reg. 19759-60, 19770 (1970).
32 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.56-2(e), Ex. (3), 35 Fed. Reg. 19760 (1970).
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interesting to focus on the two major preferences available to those in
the oil and gas production business-excess depletion (item number
eight on the list of 11 ) and intangible drilling costs (item number 11 ).
The depletion preference has been around since 196983 but for those
in the oil and gas industry, it became markedly less significant in 1975,
when Congress made percentage depletion available on only a limited
basis to small independent producers. The specific item of tax prefer-
ence is the amount by which allowable percentage depletion exceeds
the adjusted basis of the underlying property, determined on a property-
by-property basis.3 4 The concept of allowable depletion has been a
source of concern to those in the petroleum industry, who have argued
that the amount of the preference should be limited to the depletion
deduction actually claimed. In view of the specific statutory language,
however, it is difficult to justify the conclusion unless some support can
be drawn from the new tax benefit provisions.
The intangible drilling cost preference is a recent addition. It was
rejected by Congress back in 1969,35 and reappeared in the House
version of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The proposal went through
several stages, with the Conference Committee ultimately agreeing that
noncorporate taxpayers should be required to report as an item of tax
preference the difference between their intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs allowable currently and the amount that they could have
deducted had these costs been capitalized and deducted either over the
life of the underlying well as cost depletion or ratably over 10 years,
at the taxpayer's election. 6 The preference is not to apply to non-
productive wells3 7 or to taxpayers who choose to capitalize their in-
tangible drilling costs. And the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act
of 1977 has reduced the effectiveness of the preference for taxable
33 The depletion preference was developed by the Senate Finance Committee in
1969; it was also one of the nontaxed items to which personal deductions would
have been allocated under the House provisions of the 1969 Act. S. REP. NO. 91-
552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 114-15 (1969); H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, 9'1st Cong.,
1st Sess. 82 (1969).
4 See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(h), 35 Fed. Reg. 19765 (1970).
35 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1969). The Senate
Finance Committee adopted as an item of tax preference the deduction for in-
tangible drilling costs (other than those incurred in drilling a nonproductive well).
However, these costs were to be treated as a part of the recoverable cost in
determining the depletion preference. S. REP. NO. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
114-14 (1969).
36 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 131 (1975) (limited to
costs incurred in connection with nonexploratory wells); S. REP. NO. 94-938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12 (1976) (limited to costs in excess of related income);
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 426 (1976).
37 The Conference Report defines a nonproductive well and tells taxpayers
what to do when it is not possible to determine until after the end of the taxable
year whether a well is, in fact, nonproductive. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 426 (1976).
TAX CONFERENCE
years beginning in 1977. For one year only, the preference must be
computed by reducing the amount determined under the permanent
rules by the taxpayer's net income from all of its oil and gas proper-
ties.38 Even then, there are bound to be complaints that a taxpayer is
being penalized twice. Certainly when he goes to sell the property
before the useful life is up, it will have a lower basis for purposes of
determining gain than if intangible drilling costs had been capitalized.
Thus, there will be a larger gain and, if the new section 1254 recapture
provisions did not apply, a larger accompanying item of tax preference.
However, it is not correct to conclude that the taxpayer is thereby being
penalized twice, because the two preferences are quite different.3 9
Having said all of this, let us return once more to the Ace Diversified
Mining Company, which we will assume is a corporation for purposes
of considering two mechanical problems faced solely by corporations
under the minimum tax provisions. In 1978, Ace finds itself with an
accumulated earnings problem, and incurs a minimum tax liability of
$10,000. Can it deduct this tax in computing its accumulated taxable
income? The answer would appear to be "yes", because the minimum
tax is an income rather than an excise tax. If, of course, it were an excise
tax, a far more significant deduction for taxes would be available in
determining the corporation's regular income tax liability under Chapter
38 Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 308, 91 Stat. 153-54 (1977); see H.R. REP. NO.
95-263, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1977). The energy tax legislation presently
pending before Congress would limit the preference indefinitely to tainted in-
tangible drilling and development costs in excess of the taxpayer's net income
from oil and gas properties. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-496, pt. III, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 127-28 (1977) (on the Energy Tax Act of 1977, Title II of H.R. 6831);
S. REP. NO. 95-529, 95th Cong., 1st Sec,. 110-11 (1977) (on the Energy Produc-
tion and Conservation Tax Incentive Act, H.R. 5263).
39 As a result of the recapture provisions in section 1254, there will be no
additional capital gain just because the taxpayer's basis was never increased to
reflect his intangible drilling and development costs. Take, for example, a ca-e
in which W (who is not an independent producer and, thus, uses cost depletion)
acquires oil and gas property for $1,000x; incurs intangible drilling and develop-
ment coots of $100x, which he deducts currently; and sells the property for
$2,000x after half of the estimated production units have been extracted. Had the
intangible drilling costs been capitalized, W's basis at the time of sale would have
been $550x, producing capital gain of $1,450x and a preference of $725x. Because
W deducted his intangible drilling and development costs, however, he will have
a gain of $1,500x, $50x of which section 1254 will convert into ordinary income,
leaving capital gain of $1,450x and a preference of $725x. Thus, the capital gain
preference remains the same, regardless of how W decides to handle his in-
tangible drilling and development costs. On the other hand, these costs are cur-
rently subject to the minimum tax, even though they represent deferral rather
than a permanent escape from tax. The Senate Finance Committee recognized
this problem in 1969, but rejected basis adjustments on grounds of complexity.
More significantly, the Committee added that "the fact of differing tax for an
extended period of time is itself a tax preference for which the . . . tax is a
moderate charge." S. REP. NO. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1969).
TAX CONFERENCE
1, thereby producing circular computations under the basic minimum
tax.40
One year later, in 1979, Ace becomes a member of the ABC parent-
subsidiary affiliated group, which chooses not to file consolidated re-
turns. By statute, the group is limited to one $10,000 minimum tax
exemption. Thus, because two out of its three members (including
Ace) incur items of tax preference during the year, it sets about de-
termining how to allocate the $10,000 amount. The statute presently
allows the group to adopt the most advantageous apportionment
scheme, although in default, the exemption must be divided equally
among component members of the group.41 Under the Technical Cor-
rections Bill of 1977, however, the exemption would have to be ap-
portioned among each member of the group in proportion to its regular
tax deduction. 42 Otherwise, the group would be able to allocate the
$10,000 amount to relatively low tax-paying members of the group so
that together they could obtain an exemption in excess of that available
to a single corporation (which was untrue under pre-1977 law when
the minimum tax exemption was $30,000 plus a corporation's regular
tax).
Foreign Source Income: The Nature of the Preference
The treatment of foreign source preferences brings us once again
back to the concept of tax benefit. This time, the statute specifically
states that items of tax preference (putting aside for the moment items
number six and nine dealing with stock options and capital gains)
attributable to sources within any foreign country or United States
possession must be taken into account under the minimum tax to the
extent that they reduce the regular tax imposed by the United States
on income derived from sources within the United States.43 The pro-
posed regulations construct an apportionment scheme. Thus, foreign
source preferences will reduce the regular tax on United States source
income to the extent of the smallest of three amounts-foreign source
preferences, foreign source deductions in excess of foreign source gross
40See Rev. Rul. 77-396, 1977 INT. REV. BULL. NO. 44, at 6. Legislative
history indicates that the minimum tax is an income tax covered under section
275. The House Committee Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1975, for example,
states that: "Under present law, an additional income tax is imposed on an in-
dividual's or corporation's tax preferences." H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong.,
lst Sess. 130 (1975).
41 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 58(b); see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 58-1(c),
35 Fed. Reg. 19772-74 (1970).
2 H.R. 6715, § 2(b) (2), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1977); see H.R. REP. NO.
95-700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1977).
43INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 58(g) (1). Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-7(b)
(1), 35 Fed. Reg. 19777 (1970), deals with the determination of what preferences
are attributable to sources within any foreign country or United States possession.
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income, or United States source taxable income." The approach is not
unlike that taken on the domestic side when the taxpayer incurs a net
operating loss for the year, in that the preference items are stacked
last. But the consequences are quite different. The net operating loss
approach results in deferral or forgiveness of the minimum tax. The
stacking of foreign preference items last, however, maximizes the mini-
mum tax impact by filling up the difference between foreign source
deductions and foreign source gross income first with foreign preference
items. This is consistent with the statutory mandate that preference
items must be used before nonpreference items in computing a tax-
payer's Chapter 1 tax.
When the taxpayer with both domestic and foreign source income
incurs an overall net operating loss, the simple apportionment scheme
in the proposed regulations turns into what some might characterize
as a three-legged monster. The problem will arise when United States
source taxable income is not large enough to currently absorb all of the
foreign preferences which have been apportioned to the taxpayer's
foreign source net operating loss. Under the proposed regulations, these
unused amounts must be held in suspense until they offset the tax-
payer's United States source income in subsequent or earlier taxable
years. If they never do, of course, they will never be converted into
actual items of tax preference. Thus, the problems of apportionment
start all over again. The regulations tell taxpayers how to allocate their
deductions from other years so that they can determine the extent to
which unused foreign source preferences produce a tax benefit by
reducing United States source taxable income in the year to which they
are carried. There are four principles: deductions attributable to United
States source income offset taxable income from United States sources
before any remaining portion of the net operating loss; then deductions
attributable to foreign sources offset taxable foreign source income;
within this latter group, nonsuspense preferences must be used up first;
and finally, suspense preferences offset United States source taxable
income before other foreign deductions.45 In this fashion, the conversion
of suspense preferences into actual preferences is maximized. But the
process does not stop at that point. Having identified the preference,
the taxpayer must determine the extent to which it can be used. When
there is a net operating loss carryforward, the full amount of the con-
verted preferences may not always be useful on an immediate basis,
because in computing a taxpayer's current tax liability under normal
44 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-7(c) (1) (i), 35 Fed. Reg. 19779 (1970), deal-
ing with a taxpayer on the overall foreign tax credit limitation. Different rules
apply to taxpayers using the per country foreign tax credit limitation, which has
generally been repealed. For taxpayers claiming a foreign tax deduction, the
apportionment scheme developed for those on the overall foreign tax credit
limitation will presumably apply. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
115 (1969).
45 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-7(c) (1) (ii), 35 Fed. Reg. 19779 (1970).
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net operating loss procedures, nonpreference deductions must always
be used up first before taking into account preference items. Any un-
used amounts can then be carried forward for use in subsequent taxable
years, but now as full fledged preferences."
In the foreign preference world, capital gain items and stock options
afford somewhat of an oasis, not on any substantive basis, but because
the principles prescribed by statute are conceptually easier to under-
stand. A foreign source preference will not be taken into account if,
under the laws of the governing foreign jurisdiction, preferential treat-
ment is not accorded gain from the sale or exchange of capital assets
(in the case of preference number nine) or transfers of shares of stock
pursuant to stock options (in the case of preference number six)."
There are two major issues. What is meant by the term "preferential
treatment", and is the capital gain or stock option item of tax prefer-
ence really attributable to sources outside the United States? The second
question, of course, must be answered first, because only a foreign
source preference has any chance of escaping the minimum tax. As a
result of demonstrated abuse, the proposed regulations now state that
when "the sales transaction is arranged in a particular manner for the
primary purpose of tax avoidance, all factors of the transaction, such
as negotiations, the execution of the agreement, the location of the
property, and the place of payment, will be considered, and the sale
will be treated as having been consummated at the place where the
substance of the sale occurred. ' ' " The Treasury has also taken a broad
approach to the problem of preferential treatment, having rejected
their initial view (one which was of particular delight to Bahamian tax
shelter enthusiasts) 49 that failure to tax income of any nature does not
afford preferential treatment. Now, deferral, lower effective rates, or
no significant amount of tax will be deemed to have bestowed a prefer-
ence. Then there is the catch-all, which provides that income is ac-
corded preferential, treatment if the laws of the foreign country by any
other method provide tax treatment for the particular item of income
more beneficial than the tax treatment otherwise accorded income by
that country. 50 Thus, the two major issues under the foreign capital
40 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.56-2(c) (2), 1.58-7(c) (1) (iii), Ex. (4), 35 Fed.
Reg. 19759, 19780-81 (1970).
4T INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 58(g) (2).
4 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-8(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 12024 (1971).
'9 See Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1971, at 1, col. 5.0 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-8(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 12024-25 (1971). Treasury
initially took the position that income, in order to be accorded preferential treat-
ment, had to be treated more beneficially for tax purposes than other items of
income. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-8(b), 35 Fed. Reg. 19784 (1970). New
regulations were proposed on June 24, 1971, but Congress was still concerned.
Thus, in the Revenue Act of 1971, section 58(g) (2) was amended, effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969, to provide that preferential
treatment will be accorded an item if the foreign country or United States posses-
sion imposes no significant amount of tax with respect to that item. See H.R.
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gain and stock option provisions have been resolved in a manner de-
signed to minimize abuse.
Equipment Leasing: Net Leases and the Grantor Trust
Equipment leasing has always been a star in the tax shelter field,
and so we have two items of tax preference of particular interest to
equipment leasing fans-accelerated depreciation on leased section
1245 property (item number three on the list of 11 ) and the amortization
of railroad rolling stock (item number five). The old leased property
preference, in effect before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, was relatively
narrow in scope. It applied only to property subject to a "net lease",
a term which Congress took pains to define essentially by focusing on
the extent of the taxpayer's risk.51 We now have a broader leased prop-
erty rule (applicable, as in the past, only to individual taxpayers, in-
cluding subchapter S corporations and personal holding companies)
under which the preference is the amount by which the allowable depre-
ciation exceeds the deduction which would have been allowable had the
taxpayer depreciated his property under the straight-line method for
each year of its useful life during which he holds the property. There
are a number of interesting nuances expressed in the proposed regula-
tions. 52 The preference must be determined on a property-by-property
basis, so that when the straight-line depreciation exceeds accelerated
depreciation with respect to a particular piece of equipment, the excess
cannot be used to offset the preference attributable to another item. On
the other hand, two or more items may be viewed as a single item (as
is true in the case of the section 1250 property preference, item number
two on the list of 11) where the periods for which depreciation is
claimed begin on the same date, and the same method, rate and estimated
useful life have been used continually for purposes of taking deprecia-
tion.
Special rules also determine the allowable and straight-line elements
of the tax preference computation. Straight-line depreciation is to be
computed by using the same useful life and salvage value that the tax-
payer used for the first year in which he depreciated the property unless,
of course, one or the other or both were not used under the method of
depreciation chosen by the taxpayer or an artificial period became the
useful life. Then the useful life and/or salvage value which would have
been proper had depreciation actually been determined under the
straight-line method will be determined by taking into account the
REP. NO. 92-533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1971); S. REP. NO. 92-437, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 71-72 (1971); H.R. REP. NO. 92-708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1971); S. REP. NO. 92-553, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1971).
51 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 57(c); see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-3, 35
Fed. Reg. 19768-69 (1970).
-2 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(c) and (b) (2) and (4), 35 Fed. Reg.
19761-63 (1970).
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same facts and circumstances (presumably including the availability of
an asset guideline period) that would have been taken into account by
the taxpayer had he used that method throughout the period the property
was held. Both straight-line and allowable depreciation include first-
year bonus depreciation, so that these additional amounts will not be
subject to the minimum tax. Similarly, allowable depreciation will not
include any amount allowable for the year during which the underlying
property is sold, to the extent that the deduction is recaptured as ordi-
nary income. Then, the need for a minimum tax disappears, for there
ceases to be deferral.
The preference for railroad rolling stock (which applies to all
taxpayers) is computed in quite a different way, although conceptually
the leased property and railroad rolling stock preferences are the same.
If a taxpayer has elected to amortize the cost of a boxcar, for example,
over a period of five years, the difference between the allowable deduc-
tion and the depreciation deduction which would otherwise have been
allowable for the particular taxable year will constitute an item of tax
preference. Again, the computations are to be made on a property-by-
property basis, but in determining what constitutes a separate unit, the
proposed regulations this time look to the rules developed for certified
pollution control facilities (preference number four on the list of 11).
There is also a difference in the offset. In the case of railroad rolling
stock, it is depreciation otherwise allowable under any of the available
methods and, where relevant, the additional first-year amount.53
We have, then, a minimum tax structure aimed at equipment leasing
deals. But how effective has it been? One obvious problem is the fact
that the leased property provisions do not apply to regular corporations.
Thus banks, for example, can go around participating in equipment
leasing transactions without being at all concerned about the minimum
tax. They can even participate through grantor trusts which enable
them to insulate themselves from direct liability should anything go
wrong. The proposed regulations kindly point out that where accelerated
depreciation on section 1245 property subject to a lease is apportioned
from a conduit entity (such as a grantor trust) to a regular corporation,
the amount so apportioned will not be treated as an item of tax prefer-
ence. 54 This is quite apart from the fact that the new at risk provisions
do not apply to regular corporations and that if two regular corporations
decide to engage in equipment leasing through a partnership, the part-
nership at risk provisions will not apply."5 Clearly, banks and other
corporations which engage in equipment leasing are the fair-haired
boys.
• 53Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(e) and (d) (2) and (4), 35 Fed. Reg. 19763-
64 (1970). In general, rapid amortization for railroad rolling stock under section
184 is available with respect to qualified property placed in service after 1968 and
before 1976.
r4 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-2(a), 35 Fed. Reg. 19774 (1970).
' See JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION 97.
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The traditional equipment leasing shelters set up as limited partner-
ships do not fare so well. For them, there is no way out of the minimum
tax or the at risk provisions unless by some miracle the underlying con-
tractual commitment to the user does not involve a lease. 56
Charitable Trusts: Excess Itemized Deductions and the Exemption
Jonathan Tree is really a very generous person. In fact, he fathers
four charitable trusts: Trust A, set up in 1966, under which all of the
interests are set aside for Xavier University; Trust B, also set up in
1966, under which he reserves for himself the life income interest, with
remainder to Xavier Prep; Trust C, a charitable remainder annuity trust
established in 1977, under which Jonathan is to receive an annual an-
nuity of $5,000, with remainder to the United Fund; and Trust D, a
charitable annuity trust also established in 1977, under which the Peach
Blossom Community Church is to receive a guaranteed annual annuity
of $20,000, with remainder to Jonathan's daughter upon the death
of his wife. Up until 1976, the 1966 trusts did not really have to pay any
attention to the minimum tax, because their investments were limited to
stocks, bonds and government securities. In a very accommodating move,
the Service made it clear that where capital gains were set aside for
charity and the charitable set aside deduction continued to be available
under section 642(c), the section 1202 deduction taken into account in
computing trust taxable income would not be viewed as an item of tax
preference because there could be no real enjoyment of the preference
given the fact that without it, the capital gains would still have been
fully exempt from tax. 57
Then along came the Tax Reform Act of 1976, with a new preference
called excess itemized deductions. The basic concept is quite simple.
Congress was concerned about the fact that a number of individuals
with high adjusted gross incomes were paying no tax. Thus, in order to
make it possible to impose some tax on itemized deductions, Congress
developed an item of tax preference (number one on the list of 11 ) for
the amount by which a taxpayer's total deductions (after excluding
certain excepted amounts) exceed 60 percent of his adjusted gross
income.5, Exceptions were provided for those deductions allowable in
50 The term "lease" is defined in the proposed regulations. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 1.57-3(d), 35 Fed. Reg. 19769 (1970). Also, the Internal Revenue Service
has recently taken an expansive approach to the problem in a revenue ruling
which holds that an individual who buys a master record and licenses it to a
record producer, who will manufacture records for sale and pay him a royalty
for each one sold, is "leasing" property in a transaction subject to the at risk
provisions of section 465. Rev. Rul. 77-397, 1977 INT. REV. BULL. NO. 44, at
7.
5 Rev. Rul. 74-317, 1974-2 CUM. BULL. 13. See also Rev. Rul. 73-43, 1973-1
CUM. BULL. 37 (dealing with an amount paid to charity).
58 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1975) (referring to
itemized deductions in excess of 70 percent of adjusted gross income); S. REP.
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arriving at adjusted gross income, the standard deduction, personal
exemptions, medical expenses and casualty losses. It was all quite logical
in the context of a human taxpayer. The preference, however, was also
to apply to other individual taxpayers, including estates and trusts. For
this latter group, Congress developed a special set of rules, so that
certain additional items such as administration expenses and mandatory
income distributions to beneficiaries would be viewed as deductions
allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income.
These new provisions really left the trustees of Jonathan's 1966 trusts
up a tree. Nowhere did Congress discuss how to handle the charitable
deduction available to trusts under section 642(c). Was it possible that
a charitable deduction would produce an item of tax preference even
where all interests were set aside for charity? If so, how would Trust A,
for example, compute its minimum tax exposure? Suppose that the trust
had gross income (from interest and dividends) of $20,000, a $20,000
charitable set-aside, administration expenses of $2,000 (payable out of
corpus), and a personal exemption of $100. Presumably, the trust was
supposed to apply 60 percent to $18,000 (income of $20,000 less the
administration expenses) and deduct the result ($10,800) from $18,000
(the charitable deduction), to arrive at preference income of $7,200.
But even this simple calculation was not clear. What was the trust to do
about its personal exemption; as in the case of a human taxpayer, would
it not be appropriate to reduce the potential preference by this amount,
even though there was no specific statutory authorization? What about
the concept of tax benefit? Was it proper to assume, as the figures do,
that the trust used up its good deductions first in computing taxable
income? Also, when Congress provided that administration expenses
were to be treated as a deduction allowable in arriving at adjusted gross
income, did it mean to say that the 60 percent figure was to be applied
to actual adjusted gross income unreduced by administration expenses?
This nice guy approach would reduce the preference as previously com-
puted by $1,200.
Trusts were not the only people with problems under the new excess
itemized deductions preference, which soon after enactment (as a result
of the zero bracket amount changes made by the Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977) was relabeled a preference for "adjusted
itemized deductions." 5" How, for example, were subchapter S corpora-
tions and personal holding companies (both viewed as individual tax-
payers for purposes of the minimum tax) to compute adjusted gross
income, which for them was an alien concept?
The Technical Corrections Bill of 1977 as passed by the House
NO. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1976) (adding a special rule for estates
and trusts, and reducing the floor to 60 percent); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 425-26 (1976).
• Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 101(d) (5) (A) and (B), 91 Stat. 133, amending INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 57(a) (I) and (b).
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would solve many of these problems. The preference for adjusted item-
ized deductions would clearly not apply to subchapter S corporations
and personal holding companies.60 An estate or trust would not be
required to treat its personal exemption as a tainted itemized deduction
(viewed by the House Committee Report as simply a clarifying amend-
ment). 61 Also, the charitable deduction would not be viewed as an
itemized deduction under four circumstances-in the case of an estate,
where there is no real opportunity for tax planning; in the case of a
wholly charitable trust, where imposing the minimum tax as the result
of a gift to charity would simply harm the charitable beneficiaries; in
the case of a pooled income fund, where the same thing would occur;
and, finally, in the case of deductions attributable to pre-1976 transfers
in trust, made before the grantor had reason to know that charitable
trusts afforded an opportunity to avoid the minimum tax on adjusted
itemized deductions at the human taxpayer level. The 1977 Bill does
not deal specifically with charitable remainder trusts because they are
generally exempt from both the income and minimum tax.62
Let us return, then, to Jonathan's Tree's 1966 trusts and the two
that he was daring enough to set up in 1977. If the 1977 Bill changes
take effect, Trust A will not have to worry about the adjusted (or
excess) itemized deductions preference, in part because it is wholly
charitable. Trust B will be safe because it was created long before the
adjusted itemized deductions preference was conceived- (unless, of
course, additional property is transferred to the trust after 1975). Also,
newly established Trust C will be safe because charitable remainder
annuity trusts are normally tax exempt. This leaves Trust D, the only
problem child. Were it not, Jonathan Tree could use this and similarly
created trusts to avoid the minimum tax. The possibilities are fasci-
nating to behold. Jonathan, of course, is a very charitable man, so that
it is quite likely that on his own he will want to give more than 60
percent of his adjusted gross income to charity each year, thereby
triggering the adjusted itemized deductions preference, offset by only
a single minimum tax exemption. Why, then, not avoid the entire prob-
lem by making charitable gifts through a charitable lead trust such as
Trust D? To close this way around the adjusted itemized deductions
preference, the statute now applies the preference to charitable lead
trusts; deliberately, the 1977 Bill would make no change.
But what real impact will the preference have on Trust D, assuming
gross income of $20,000 (all of which is paid to the Peach Blossom
Community Church), administration expenses of $2,000, and a $100
personal exemption? The exact amount of the adjusted itemized deduc-
tions preference will be $7,100, based on two significant conclusions-
no See H.R. REP. NO. 95-700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977). See also JOINT
COMMITTEE EXPLANATION 108.
61 H.R. REP. NO. 95-700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-1i (1977).
62 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-700, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 10-11 (1977).
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60 percent is to be applied to adjusted gross income less administration
expenses63 and, in fact, the trust receives a tax benefit from the chari-
table contribution of only $17,900 ($20,000 less administration expenses
and the personal exemption), thus reducing the charitable deduction for
purposes of the preference to $17,900. We then come to the more
interesting question: Will the trust be able to use the full $10,000
minimum exemption, thereby reducing its minimum tax liability to zero,
or should the Peach Blossom Community Church be responsible for
paying the minimum tax, after taking into account its own $10,000
minimum exemption? The statute indicates that a trust must apportion
its items of tax preference between the trust and its beneficiaries, on the
basis of trust income allocable to each.64 Here, of course, the Peach
Blossom Community Church receives all trust income. Is it possible
that the church thereby becomes the lucky recipient of a tax preference?
The answer is probably "no", because the church is not the recipient of
trust distributable net income; instead it receives only a charitable gift.
This approach would leave the preference at the trust level, presumably
with the benefit of a full $10,000 minimum exemption, in that the
statute requires a trust to give up part (or all) of its exemption only
when preference items are allocated to beneficiaries.6 5 Trust D may,
therefore, not be such a bad idea after all. In fact, it might even make
sense to set up a number of separate trusts modeled after Trust D, in
order to receive the benefit of multiple $10,000 minimum exemptions.
However, there will always be the problem of substance over form.
Transfers of Appreciated Property in Trust: Computing the
Minimum Tax
Trusts have always been a useful tax planning tool. Before the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, one popular number was the peddler's second
pocket. The setting was classic. The peddler was just about to sell some
of his appreciated securities, when he suddenly realized that the resulting
income tax liability would be enormous, in fact around 50 percent of
the resulting gain (due in part to the reduction in his personal service
income subject to the maximum tax). How could he cut back on this
amount and still direct the destiny of the proceeds? The obvious answer
was a trust, funded with the appreciated property. Upon receiving the
68 Section 2(b) (3) of the Technical Corrections Bill of 1977 might be read so
that administration expenses would be included as part of adjusted gross income
to which 60 percent must be applied, but would be excluded (as a deduction
"allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income") in determining the extent to
which item-zed deductions exceed the floor. Such an interpretation is difficult to
support.
641NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 58(c) (1); see Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-3,
35 Fed. Reg. 19775-76 (1970).
65 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 58(c) (2).
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property, the trust could sell it and pay a tax at significantly lower
rates.6
6
Gone, however, are the good old days. Now, whenever appreciated
property is sold at a gain within two years after it is transferred in trust,
the trust will be taxed on the unrealized gain at the time of the transfer
in trust as though it had been recognized by the grantor-at his top
marginal rate. There may also be a minimum tax.6 7 In this context,
there are some interesting computational problems. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that Trust E (an accumulation trust) realizes a long-term capital
gain of $50,000 upon the sale of nondepreciable property that it received
from the grantor and held for a period of one year, during which there
were no further price fluctuations. The gain will produce $25,000 of
tax preference income, which will have to be included among the
grantor's items of tax preference in order to determine the resulting
minimum tax at the trust level. Only the grantor's minimum exemption
of $10,000 will be available to offset the amount subject to tax. But
then, what happens to the minimum exemption available to the trust?
Trust E is required to accumulate income, so that normally the exemp-
tion would not disappear. However, the trust can distribute principal,
and in fact decides to do so in the year during which the sale occurs,
by distributing the gain to beneficiary Jones. Does the trust thereby lose
all or some portion of its $10,000 amount? If the trust also has another
capital gains preference of $25,000 and no other net income for the
year, the answer may be that half of its exemption will disappear, on
the theory that half of the items of tax preference end up in the hands
of Jones. On close analysis, however, does this make any sense? Per-
haps, for purposes of allocating the minimum exemption, items of tax
preference taxed at the grantor's rates should not be viewed as prefer-
ences in the hands of the trust.6
Let us switch, now, to the grantor who, for computational purposes
only, will have to include the long-term capital gain of $50,000 in his
regular income tax base. Without this amount, the grantor has taxable
income of zero, a net operating loss carried over from the prior taxable
year of $50,000 (all attributable to nonpreference items), and no cur-
rent items of tax preference. Will the $50,000 carryover reduce the
long-term capital gain coming from the trust to zero, so that the grantor
will have neither "reconstructed" taxable income (after the section 1202
deduction) nor "reconstructed" items of tax preference? The answer
should be no, because even if the $50,000 carryover is applied against
the gain, it will have continuing vitality in subsequent taxable years of
the grantor (assuming that the carryforward period has not expired),
given the fact that the gain never really becomes a part of the grantor's
66 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1975).
67 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 644; see S. REP. NO. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 172-74 (1976); JOINT COMMITTEE EXPLANATION 162-64.6 8 See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.58-3(b), Ex. (4), 35 Fed. Reg. 19775 (1970).
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income tax base-it is merely assumed to be part of his income for
purposes of determining the tax payable by the trust. The Technical
Corrections Bill of 1977 confirms this result.69
Postscript
The future approach to tax shelters is uncertain. Should Congress
attack them directly by eliminating preference items such as accelerated
depreciation; should the minimum tax be expanded to pick up addi-
tional items, such as rapid amortization for historic structures, or modi-
fied to become an alternative tax; or should a greater effort be made
to match income and deductions, both from the point of view of timing
and the uses to which income items are put? The analysis will continue,
but at present it is certain that the tax shelter world has been dealt a
serious blow, in part by the current mini-maxi tax.
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-700, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-29 (1977).
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LAURENCE NEAL WOODWORTH*
For all of its infinite and tedious complexity, the federal tax
code maintains a sense of decency and reason. It has a coherent
architecture. You might wonder how that happens since, notoriously,
every major tax bill is finally enacted in an atmosphere of extreme
confusion, haste, passion and anxiety. For the past 15 years one
leading reason for the tax system's integrity was the vigilance of
Laurence Neal Woodworth, who died this week. He had joined
the Carter administration earlier this year as Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for tax policy, but previously he had been the staff
director of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
A tax system is a nation's definition of social equity-its answer
to the great question of what's fair. In taxation, the large philo-
sophic issues never lie far behind the niggling legalistic details. The
role of the congressional staff experts on taxation is not a com-
fortable one. The tax committees are generally led by tough and
strong-willed men; stakes run high, and no bills are more fiercely
lobbied. Under weak leadership, the Joint Committee's staff would
have been ground to powder long ago between its two masters in
the House and Senate. Under Mr. Woodworth, it built a monu-
mental reputation for impartial and authoritative judgment. When,
for example, Congress needed an unimpeachable expert for the
ugly job of auditing Mr. Nixon's tax returns, it turned automatically
to Mr. Woodworth.
To work effectively, the congressional system requires enormous
talent and industry among its staffs. Those qualities are very un-
evenly distributed through the labyrinths of the congressional offices.
But the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has become an
acknowledged model. Mr. Woodworth always left the political de-
cisions to the politicians, and never tried to undercut them with
technical obfuscation. But he worked long into the nights after the
committee meetings to ensure that the politicians understood the
consequences of their votes. Even the most flamboyant of senators
was unlikely to press an idea in the face of Mr. Woodworth's
warning that it wouldn't work. His death now is a double misfortune
to the Carter administration. He was the key figure in the drafting
of the President's tax-revision bills. But he was also the administra-
tion's principal ambassador to Congress on this delicate subject, and
he had earned a degree of trust and respect there that no other
person at the Treasury enjoys.
He was a remarkable example of a certain style of public servant
-one who is rarely a noted public figure, but who acquires a pro-
found influence through sheer intellectual force and honesty. His
subject was one that touches all of us every day. It is an American
custom to complain about the tax system's vices while taking its
virtues for granted. They are not accidental, but were written into
law by a small number of people-among whom Mr. Woodworth
was eminent-who labored with learning and skill in pursuit of the
just balance between public and private interests.
*Reprinted from Editorial of the December 10, 1977 issue of the Washington Post.
